

Giustificazione epistemica, verità e disaccordo in un mondo non ideale

TOMMASO PIAZZA

Epistemic Justification, Truth, and Disagreement in a Non-ideal World

Abstract: In this commentary on Federica Liveriero's book *Relational Liberalism*, I focus on four aspects relevant to the discussion of the co-authorship model. I explore the relationship between epistemic justification and truth, distinguishing the thesis that epistemic justification is justification for truth from the thesis that epistemic justification entails truth; I defend the thesis that moderate foundationalism provides an alternative fallibilist epistemology to coherentism; I suggest that the anti-realist perspective to which Liveriero alludes implies the potential existence of faultless disagreement and I suggest that this could represent a problem for the co-authorship model; finally, I draw attention to the fact that the disinformation pandemic may undermine the presumption of epistemic peerhood of our social interlocutors which is central to the co-authorship model.

Keywords: Theory of justice, Epistemic justification, Truth, Coherentism, Foundationalism, Anti-realism, Faultless disagreement, Disinformation.

notizie di POLITEIA, XLI, 158, 2025. ISSN 1128-2401 pp. 205-209